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This comment seeks to focus on the 
significance of civil proceedings as a 
remedy for corporate abuse in public 
listed companies. The real need is to ease 
the path of the minority shareholder 
litigant and not to make such proceedings 
more difficult than they would be in the 
case of private companies. It is open to 
question whether the proposal in the Law 
Commission's recent consultation paper 
Shareholder Remedies (paper 142, see part 
16) will in fact achieve this objective.
WHAT IS NEEDED
Minority shareholders in private 
companies do not need yet another 
remedy in the form of a statutory 
derivative action (as proposed by the Law 
Commission). That need arises in respect 
of public listed companies where the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries 
(No. 2) [1982] Ch 204 appears to render 
the 'common law' derivative action 
redundant. In the case of listed 
companies, the other sanctions against 
wrongdoing by directors are either 
inappropriate (s. 459 petitions) or 
inapplicable, except in the most unusual 
circumstances (just and equitable 
winding up, wrongful trading and 
disqualification).
At least in the case of fraudulent 
breaches of directors' fiduciary duties 
(e.g. bribery or misappropriation of 
company assets) the new remedy 
proposed by the Law Commission is self- 
evidently needed. It is hoped that the 
Law Commission's proposal will provide 
a cure for the problems that exist in the 
common law derivative action. The 
evidence of the Canadian experience 
shows that, in a civil litigation climate 
very similar to that in England, a 
statutory derivative action will only very 
occasionally be resorted to by minority 
shareholders in respect of public listed 
companies. It is important that a 
substantial minority shareholder (e.g. a 
corporate investor or a wealthy individual 
shareholder) should be able to resort to 
civil litigation when strongly motivated to 
do so.
ADEQUACY OF SANCTIONS
The significance of civil litigation as a 
means to redress intra-corporate 
wrongdoing cannot be lightly dismissed. 
Even the most sophisticated City 
regulation (e.g. Cadbury/Greenbury- 
style corporate governance of the 
workings of the Panel and its Takeover
o
Code) can only be preventative medicine 
against fraud. Redress which will actually 
benefit the company (in those situations 
where it is in reality unable to initiate 
such proceedings in its own name) will 
always be needed. Criminal proceedings 
are not the real solution. Such 
proceedings often prove impossible to 
mount or collapse in the course of a trial. 
Insolvency proceedings clearly only 
benefit creditors. The delayed outcome 
of a Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) inspectors' report will not in itself 
restore the company's money and assets.
If institutional investors are to 
perform their 'Cadbury' function of 
sorting out abuse and gross
o o
incompetence in listed companies, they 
would seem to need an adequate sanction 
in reserve. The ability to threaten 
derivative proceedings would seem to 
provide a powerful sanction where 
recalcitrant directors refuse to respond to 
pressure from institutional investors. 
This may prove much more effective than 
organising a takeover bid or selling the 
institutional investors' holding and so 
driving down the share price. It could be 
argued that the path should be made 
easier for institutional investors (and 
other corporate investors) with, say, a 3% 
or 5% holding in a listed pic (either singly 
or jointly with other institutions).
WOOLF REPORT
The heavy-handed remedies available 
under American corporate law (notably 
SEC regulation and a still active market in 
derivative litigation funded from the 
company's coffers) are not needed in 
Britain. There is nevertheless a clear need 
for the reform of the existing common 
law derivative action. Problems still 
remain about the Law Commission's 
proposals in the consultation paper 
Shareholder Remedies. They may receive a
very traditionist interpretation by some 
of the judiciary. This might bring back 
much of the old law on fraud in a 
minority in a new guise.
Further, the Law Commission's 
proposals may be strangled by the DTI 
under the influence of urgent advice from 
say, the Confederation of British Industry 
or the IOD. Another more favourable 
development (not requiring primary 
legislation) is that the implementation of 
the Woolf Report, reforming civil 
procedure, may provide an alternative 
route to reform the worst aspects of the 
existing derivative action. The problem of 
de facto wrongdoer control of listed 
companies may well be solved in this way. 
This would allow a derivative action 
based on a serious noh-ratifiable breach 
of fiduciary duty to be brought to trial 
without undue difficulty.
CANADIAN EXAMPLE
The evidence of the Canadian experience 
shows that, in a civil litigation climate 
very similar to that in England, a 
statutory derivative action will only very 
occasionally be resorted to by minority 
shareholders in respect of public listed 
companies. It is important that a 
substantial minority shareholder (e.g. a 
corporate investor or a wealthy 
individual shareholder) should be able to 
resort to civil litigation when stronglyo o J
motivated to do so.
PROBLEMS UNRESOLVED
In laying down its five guidelines, the 
Law Commission fails, as with the rest of 
its proposals on the proposed statutory 
derivative action, to discriminate in any 
way between the general run of private 
companies and public listed companies, 
large or small. The problem raised by the 
de facto control of most public listed 
companies in the context of the new 
statutory procedure is addressed 
nowhere. In the earlier part of the paper 
Shareholder Remedies, where the defects of 
the existing common law derivative 
action are carefully analysed, the problem 
of establishing wrongdoer control is fully
o o J
explored in the light of what Professor 
Gower described as the 'calamitous' 
observations of the Court of Appeal in
Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries.
order a meeting. In proceedings brought 
against a listed pic by an institutional or 
other corporate investor who meets an 
appropriate percentage requirement, the
However, the difficulties in the case 
of public listed companies under de facto 
control do not entirely disappear when 
posed in the context of the new statutory 
remedy. Whether civil litigation in theJ o
form of derivative proceedings has a 
particularly important part to play in the 
case of just such public listed companies 
has already been contested. Where an 
institutional investor (or another 
substantial corporate shareholder) is 
seeking to mount such litigation, it is 
desirable that no unnecessary barrier 
should obstruct such proceedings. While 
not going so far as to suggest that a test as
o o oo
to percentage of shareholding (as in the 
EU Commission's draft fifth directive) 
should replace the judicial discretion to 
grant leave, it can be argued that, where 
an institutional investor (or other 
substantial investors), either individually 
or acting jointly holds say, 3% (or 
possibly 5%) of the issued share capital of 
a listed pic, the judicial discretion to 
grant leave should tend to be exercised in 
favour of the applicant. A more thorough 
scrutiny should be reserved for private 
companies or individual shareholders in 
listed companies.
TWO PROBLEM AREAS
In the particular case of two of the 
five guidelines (intended to assist the 
court on an application for leave) 
problems are likely to occur. These two 
are ratification and the decision of 'an 
independent organ'. Shareholder Remedies 
refers to ratification as a guideline in the 
grant of leave and in the case 
management power for the court to
ratification guideline should only be used 
sparingly. Its application could add very 
substantially to the delay, costs and 
adverse publicity of derivative 
proceedings. There is the further danger 
that the case law on ratifiable and non- 
ratifiable directors' duties would once 
more dominate the new statutory 
derivative action. While the shareholders' 
power to ratify breaches of duty in 
general meeting mav still have some role
O O J
in private companies, the ill-attended 
shareholders' meetings of listed pics are 
not an appropriate forum in which 
carefully weighed decisions about 
corporate litigation should be made (as 
the Prudential case well illustrates). In 
addition, the directors' duty of care and 
skill might be a very difficult topic about 
which to litigate successfully.
The 'decision of an independent 
organ' is an ever more debateable 
criterion, more especially in the case of a 
listed pic. As a concept it is not clearly 
defined in Shareholder's Remedies and was 
only vaguely delineated in Smith v Croft. It 
might allow not only a majority of a 
minority but also a minority of a minority 
to bar proceedings in substantial private 
companies. In listed pics an auditor's 
report should not be a substitute for the 
right to litigate. Whether every executive
O O J
director is, Cadbury-style, judicially 
detached is also open to question.
In the wrong judicial hands the ability 
to invoke majority' shareholders' power 
(or other 'independent organ' power) 
may well enable the worst aspects of the 
Court of Appeal's decision in Prudential v
Newman Industries to be smuggled back in 
the exercise of the new statutory 
discretion to grant leave. In the case of 
listed pics it might kill off the use of this 
remedy at an early stage.
J J O
DANGER OF EXCESSIVE 
CAUTION
The Law Commission makes this 
observation (among others) on why it 
proposes a list of guidelines to assist the 
court on the application for leave:
'The most important advantage oj listing 
them is that they should assist in building up a 
body of reported cases which will guide 
shareholders and advisers. '
In the course of time this will 
undoubtedly become true. However it 
may also produce (as did the case law on 
the old derivative action) over-cautious 
judicial decisions. This excessive caution 
may be most in evidence when public 
listed companies are the subject of 
derivative proceedings. In such cases, 
where the new remedy is most needed, 
great discouragement may be given at an 
early stage.
IN THE WRONG HANDS
In the wrong judicial hands the ability to 
invoke majority shareholders' power (or 
other 'independent organ' power) may 
well enable the worst aspects of the 
Court of Appeal's decision in Prudential v 
Newman Industries to be smuggled back in 
the exercise of the new statutory 
discretion to grant leave. In the case of 
listed pics it might kill off the use of this 
remedy at an early stage.
As contended earlier, institutional 
investors meeting a percentage test 
should be given an easier ride. There is all 
too great a likelihood that all the old Foss 
v Harbottle judicial attitudes may be re- 
introduced in the exercise of the new 
judicial discretion. De facto wrongdoer 
control (the great stumbling block in the 
Prudential litigation) may once more raise 
its obstinate head, this time in a new 
guise. In the case of private companies 
and individual shareholder litigants 
(where the Law Commission's criteria 
are much more justified), the need for a 
new statutory derivative action is much 
less apparent. ®
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